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DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. AKERS, 
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v. 
VERNON J. and MARTI MORTENSEN, 
Defendants/Appellants, 
and 
D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., DAVID L. 
WHITE and MICHELLE V. WHITE, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
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County. Honorable John T. Mitchell, District Judge, presiding. 
Susan Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d' Alene ID 83814 
208.664.1684 fax 
Attorney for Respondents 
1 
Dustin Deissner 
Deissner Law Office 
1707 W. Broadway Ave. 
Spokane W A 99201 
509.462.0827 voice 
509.462.0834 fax 
Deissnerlaw@aol.com email 
LS.B.# 5937 
Attorney for Marti Mortensen 
Table of Contents. 
Table of Cases and Authorities ...................................... , iv 
Statement of the Case ............................................. -1-
Nature of the case ........................................... -1-
Proceedings Below .......................................... -1-
Statement of Facts .......................................... -3-
Issues Presented on Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. -4-
Attorney Fees on Appeal ........................................... -4-
Argument ....................................................... -5-
1. Location of Easement ...................................... -5-
2. Punitive Damages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. -5-
3. Attorneys Fees ........................................... -7-
4. Punitive Damages Allocable to MARTI MORTENSEN .......... -9-
A. This Court should Rule That Punitive Damages may not be 
Collected from a Divorced Spouse. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. -9-
1. Basis of Community Liability for Intentional Torts of 
Spouse .................................... -9-
2. Idaho has not Decided if a Community is Liable for 
Punitive Damages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. -11-
A. Punitive Damages Against Agent Not 
Automatically Imputed to Principal 
-12-
B. Punitive Damages are not Automatically imputed 
to a Codefendant 
-13-
C. Purpose of Punitive Damages is Deterrence 
-13-
11 
3. In This Case Punitives Should not Apply to MARTI 
MORTENSEN ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. -13-
B. MARTI MORTENSEN should be permitted to raise this issue 
on remand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. -lS-
I. Scope of Remand .............................. -15-
2. New Events ................................... -17-
5. Recusal ................................................ -18-
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. -18-
111 
Table of Cases and Authorities 
. Akers v. Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39, 205 P.3d 1175 (2009) -5- -16-. . . . . . . . . . . . , 
Bell Rapids Mut. Irrigation Co. v. Hausner, 126 Idaho 752, 754, 890 P.2d 338, 
340 (1995) ..................................................... -17-
Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629,862 P.2d 321 (1993) ........... -7-
Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 905, 665 P.2d 661,669 (1983) 
-6- -11-. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 
Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 496 P.2d 682 (1972) ............... -6-, -12-
Griff, Inc. v. Curry Bean Co., 138 Idaho 315, 322, 63 P.3d 441,448 (2003) . -12-
Hansen v. Blevins, 84 Idaho 49,367 P.2d 758 (1962) .................... -9-
Hegg v. Internal Revenue Serv., 136 Idaho 61, 28 P.3d 1004 (2001) ....... -11-
IRe 6-202 ...................................................... -7-
Linscott v. Rainier National Life Insurance Co., 100 Idaho 854, 
606 P.2d 958 (1980) ............................................. -13-
Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital, Inc. 122 Idaho 47, 830 P.2d 1185 
(1991) ..................................................... -11-, -12-
McFadden v. Watson, 51 Ariz. 110, 74 P.2d 1181 (1938) ................ -10-
McHenry v. Short, 29 Wash.2d 263, 186 P.2d 900 (1947) ............... -10-
IV 
Mountainview Landowners Co-op. Ass'n, Inc. v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861, 136 P.3d 
332 (2006) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. -15-
Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., 123 Idaho 937,854 P.2d 280 (1993) 
............................................................... -12-
State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 886,11 P.3d 1101, 1104 (2000) .......... -16-
Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp. 140 Idaho 416 95 P.3d 34 (2004) ..... -13-
Verheyen v. Dewey, 27 Idaho 1, 146 P. 1116 (1915) .................... -13-
v 
Statement of the Case 
Nature of the case 
This case is the latest iteration of an easement location and trespass dispute, 
which has been before this Court twice already. Basically there was a dispute by 
WHITE and MORTENSEN against AKERS as to whether, and where, they had an 
easement over AKERS's property to access adjoining property that was intended 
to be developed. WHITE and MORTENSEN resorted to self-help and allegedly 
went outside the easement, resulting in considerable difficulty. AKERS sued for 
trespass and The District Court found damages, punitive damages, treble damages 
and awarded attorneys fees. 
The latest decision, No. 33587/33694 entered 6/4/2008, resulted in a remand 
to determine the precise location of the easement claimed by WHITE and 
MORTENSEN, and whether damages previously awarded remained appropriate in 
light of that location determination. MARTI MORTENSEN is now divorced from 
VERNON MORTENSEN and seeks to avoid liability for VERNON's punitive 
damage liability. Tr. Vol. 1 p. 206,207. 
Proceedings Below 
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Originally filed January 10, 2002, this dispute was tried beginning in 
September, 2002 and heard in sections though December, 2003. Judgment was 
entered 05/25/2004 and appealed. This court reversed and remanded the case in 
January, 2006. An amended jUdgment on remand was entered in December, 2006 
and again appealed. This Court again reversed and remanded the matter by 
decision dated June 10, 2008. 
Substantial additional proceedings occurred thereafter in District Court, in 
the nature of motion practice - there was no new testimony taken. Judge Mitchell 
finally entered his decision and Fourth Amended Judgement and Decree on 
Second Remand August 10,2011. Tr. Vol. 3 P.606. 
In particular MARTI MORTENSEN moved to avoid application of Punitive 
Damages to her. Tr. Vol. 1 p. 209. AKERS objected, Tr. Vol. 1 p. 217 and the 
District Court struck MARTI MORTENSEN's motion. Tr. Vol. 1 p. 226. 
MARTI MORTENSEN and VERNON MORTENSEN filed a notice of 
appeal on September 21, 2011. Tr. Vol. 3 p. 642. However a post-trial motion 
had been previously filed by Defendants WHITE, Tr, Vol. 3 p. 610, so this matter 
was held in abeyance pending resolution of those motions. Those motions were 
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decided and WHITE filed a notice of appeal on 12113/2011. Tr. Vol. 3 p. 702. 
MARTI MORTENSEN is filing a separate motion to consolidate those appeals. 
Statement of Facts 
The statement of facts in Akers v. Mortensen No. 33587/33694 entered 
6/4/2008 is attached as appendix A. 
Subsequent briefing addressed the location of the easement and the 
applicability of various damages elements, but no new testimony was taken. 
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Issues Presented on Appeal 
1. Did the Court below properly fix the size and location of the easement? 
2. Are the amount of punitive damages awarded against VERNON MORTENSEN 
and MARTI MORTENSEN justified by the facts. 
3. Are the Attorneys Fees awarded against VERNON MORTENSEN and MARTI 
MORTENSEN justified by the facts. 
4. May MARTI MORTENSEN assert a claim to avoid imposition of punitive 
damages against her? 
5. Should Judge Mitchell have recused himself? 
Attorney Fees on Appeal 
MARTI MORTENSEN does not seek attorneys fees on appeal. 
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Argument 
MARTI MORTENSEN submits the following memorandum regarding 
burdens of proof. 
1. Location of Easement 
MARl MORTENSEN adopts as her argument the arguments presented by 
Appellants WHITE and VERNON MORTENSEN and incorporates the same 
herein by reference as if fully set forth. 
2. Punitive Damages 
This Court ruled in Akers v. Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39, 205 P.3d 1175 
(2009): 
Without a determination of Appellants' easement rights, it is 
impossible to determine the scope of Appellants' trespass. Therefore, 
we vacate the district court's award of damages for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress and remand the issue for further 
determination after the district court determines Appellants' easement 
rights. For the same reason, we vacate the district court's award of 
punitive damages in favor of the Akers. 
There was in fact an easement, 12.2 feet wide following a'shepard's crook' 
pathway, and WHITE and MORTENSEN had the right to use that path. The 
District Court found that VERNON MORTENSEN's trespass occurred outside of 
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that easement. 
An award of punitive damages will be sustained only when it is shown that 
the defendant acted in a manner that was "an extreme deviation from reasonable 
standards of conduct, and that the act was performed by the defendant with an 
understanding of or disregard for its likely consequences." Cheney v. Palos 
Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 905, 665 P.2d 661,669 (1983). 
In this case the District Court found MORTENSEN's actions were 
knowingly done outside the scope of that easement. MORTENSEN submits that 
since the exact location was unknown and not determined until recently, the 
requisite mental state of intent cannot be shown. The only issue should be 
whether it was reasonable for MORTENSEN to believe that the actions taken were 
occurring within the easement. 
More important, the amount of the award exceeds the limits suggested by 
this court in Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 496 P.2d 682 (1972) and modified 
by Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 904-905, 665 P.2d 661, 
668-669 (1983). In the latter the court held that: 
While no concrete formula for an award of punitive damages will control, 
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the discretion of the trial judge will continue to be exercised within the 
general advisory guidelines laid down by this Court in the past. Mindful of 
the purpose of punitive damage awards, we note that they are not favored in 
the law and therefore should be awarded only in the most unusual and 
compelling circumstances. They are to be awarded cautiously and within 
narrow limits .... An award of punitive damages will be sustained on appeal 
only when it is shown that the defendant acted in a manner that was "an 
extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, and that the act 
was performed by the defendant with an understanding of or disregard for 
its likely consequences." ... The justification for punitive damages must be 
that the defendant acted with an extremely harmful state of mind, whether 
that state be termed "malice, oppression, fraud or gross negligence" ... or 
simply "deliberate or willful" [Citations omitted] 
In this case the award goes far beyond deterrence and is merely punishment. 
VERNON MORTENSEN is unlikely to get into easement disputes again: MARTI 
MORTENSEN will certainly never get into such a dispute since she doesn't do 
property development and is no longer married to VERNON. As such the policy 
of punitive damages is not served applying them in this amount and to MARTI. 
3. Attorneys Fees 
AKERS brought several causes of action but did not prevail on all of them. 
Their entitlement to attorneys fees flows from IRC 6-202 and applies only to those 
fees incurred to enforce the trespass provisions of that statute. 
Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629,862 P.2d 321 (1993) recognizes 
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that fees must be apportioned: 
Gary is correct with respect to his assertion that where the parties have 
succeeded on entirely separate claims, those claims are properly 
distinguished and should be analyzed separately in determining whether 
attorney fees are appropriate .... We also note, however, that the trial court 
is authorized to award attorney fees only as provided by statute or contract. . 
. . In this case, the court based its award of fees on I.C. § 6-202. That statute, 
which applies to claims for intentional and wilful trespass, mandates an 
award of reasonable attorney fees in an action "brought to enforce the terms 
of this act if the plaintiff prevails." Id. As applied to the case at hand, this 
statute authorized the district court to award fees only to Kent, "the 
plaintiff' in that action, and then to award only those fees reasonably 
incurred in prosecuting the trespass action upon which he prevailed. Hence, 
even though the court found that Gary had prevailed on some of the claims 
asserted, it found no statutory basis upon which he would be entitled to any 
offsetting award. Consequently, and contrary to Gary's position, there was 
no basis for the court to apportion fees between the parties. Rather, the court 
was required to award Kent his full reasonable attorney fee attributable to 
his successful trespass claim. It is clear from the district court's 
memorandum opinion and order awarding attorney fees that the court 
considered the fact that a substantial amount of Kent's efforts were directed 
at claims upon which he did not prevail, specifically citing Kent's claim for 
trespass to the beach end of his property and Kent's claim for emotional 
distress. The court found, however, that some of the legal work performed 
on those claims overlapped with Kent's successful claim for trespass to the 
west end of his lot, and that Kent was entitled to recover those fees ..... 
Based upon its findings, which Gary does not dispute here, the court 
allocated one-half of all Kent's attorney fees, or $18,532.75, to the 
prosecution of the successful trespass claim. Upon this record, we conclude 
that the district court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and 
consistent with the legal standards applicable to its decision. 
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The burden to allocate fees must fall to AKERS as the party claiming fees. In this 
case the record does not reflect an apportionment of fees. 
4. Punitive Damages Allocable to MARTI MORTENSEN 
A. This Court should Rule That Punitive Damages may not be 
Collected from a Divorced Spouse 
It is undisputed in this case that any punitive damages that may be awarded 
against MORTENSENS will be based upon actions by VERNON MORTENSEN; 
MARTI MORTENSEN was not present and did not herse1fparticipate in any way 
in those actions. 
1. Basis of Community Liability for Intentional Torts of 
Spouse 
As a general rule, community property of a spouse is subject to execution 
for intentional torts of the other spouse; but Idaho has not applied that rule to 
punitive damages. 
In Hansen v. Blevins, 84 Idaho 49,367 P.2d 758 (1962), Blevins, who 
operated the community property bar, sprayed tear gas into the face of Hansen, a 
customer, who sued and recovered damages which he sought to satisfy from the 
wife's share of community assets. The court analyzed decisions from several other 
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states and concluded, 
It is not necessary to a decision in this case to determine whether 
community property is liable in all cases for the payment of obligations 
incurred by the tort of the husband. Here the record shows that the 
defendant committed the battery while he was actively and actually engaged 
in the management of the community business, and that what he did was 
intended to be for the protection of community property and in the 
interest of the community business. Under such circumstances the 
community is responsible for his acts. McFadden v. Watson, 51 Ariz. 110, 
74 P.2d 1181; McHenry v. Short, 29 Wash.2d 263, 186 P.2d 900; 41 C.J.S. 
Husband and Wife § 523. [Emphasis added] 
The McFadden decision cited by the Court explained, 
It is not necessary, however, in order to bind the community, that the act 
which gives rise to the obligation, though tortious in its nature, shall 
actually benefit the community. It is sufficient that it was committed by the 
spouse with the bona fide intention of protecting the interest of the 
community, and it makes no difference that the act was a mistake in 
judgment -- a tort so far as it affected the rights of other people and 
ultimately detrimental to the interest of the community. [Emphasis added] 
McFadden v. Watson, 51 Ariz. 110, 113,74 P.2d 1181 (1938). Similarly in 
McHenry v. Short, 29 Wash.2d 263, 186 P.2d 900 (1947) the husband was in the 
act of ejecting the victim from premises which the community claimed to own, so 
the husband was acting in pursuance of his management of community property or 
in the furtherance of community business. 
-10-
Then in Hegg v. Internal Revenue Serv., 136 Idaho 61, 28 P.3d 1004 (2001) 
this Court ruled, 
We have not previously addressed the issue of whether the community 
is liable for all tort obligations, even those which might be 
characterized as separate, and because of the nature of the tort 
obligation in this case, it is not necessary for us to reach that issue here . 
. . . . Community assets may be reached to satisfy a debt incurred by one 
spouse's fraud committed during marriage even if the other spouse is 
completely innocent of the fraud and has no personal liability where the 
fraud benefits the community or occurs during the spouse's management of 
the community. 
2. Idaho has not Decided if a Community is Liable for 
Punitive Damages 
The general rule set out in Hansen and Hegg applies to intentional torts, but 
not necessarily to punitive damages. Punitive damages require more than mere 
intent: they require willful and malicious conduct. Once a spouse engages in 
willfully malicious conduct, he is no longer seeking to benefit the community. 
The justification for punitive damages must be that the defendant acted with 
an extremely harmful state of mind, whether that state be termed "malice, 
oppression, fraud or gross negligence"; "malice, oppression, wantonness"; 
or simply "deliberate or willful." 
Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital, Inc. 122 Idaho 47, 830 P.2d 1185 
(1991), quoting Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 905, 665 P.2d 
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661, 669 (1983). 
The punitive damages award against MORTENSENS is based upon trespass 
and aggressive actions by VERNON MORTENSEN while trespassing. Similar 
conduct was found to support punitive damages in Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 
683,496 P.2d 682 (1972). 
A. Punitive Damages Against Agent Not Automatically 
Imputed to Principal 
Idaho may impose liability on a principal for intentional misconduct of an 
agent. Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., 123 Idaho 937,854 P.2d 280 
(1993). But Idaho does not automatically impose punitive damages against a 
principal for the acts of an agent. Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital, Inc., 
supra, held: 
It is settled beyond dispute in Idaho that a principal is liable for punitive 
damages based on the acts of its agent only in circumstances in which 
the principal participated, or in which the principal authorized or 
ratified the agent's conduct. ... Furthermore, it is well established that 
punitive damages may not be assessed against a principal based upon 
the acts of an agent absent a clear showing of authorization or 
ratification. 
Griff, Inc. v. Curry Bean Co., 138 Idaho 315, 322, 63 P.3d 441,448 (2003) 
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interpreted Manning to require that: 
To recover punitive damages against a corporation, one must show that an 
officer or director participated in, or ratified, the conduct underlying the 
punitive damage award. 
Accord: Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp. 140 Idaho 416 95 P.3d 34 (2004). 
B. Punitive Damages are not Automatically imputed to a 
Codefendant 
Verheyen v. Dewey, 27 Idaho 1, 146 P. 1116 (1915) held that even if one 
defendant was prompted by malicious motives in the acts that he did, the other 
defendant cannot be made liable on account of the malicious motives of his 
codefendant unless his codefendant is implicated in such malice. 
C. Purpose of Punitive Damages is Deterrence 
Finally we note that the primary purpose for punitive damages is deterrence 
of similar conduct. Linscott v. Rainier National Life Insurance Co., 100 Idaho 854, 
606 P.2d 958 (1980). 
3. In This Case Punitives Should not Apply to MARTI 
MORTENSEN 
Punitive damages were awarded against VERNON MORTENSEN due to 
his intentional, malicious actions in trespassing on AKERS' property without 
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knowing there was an easement. This Court may decide to reimpose punitives 
once the exact easement is determined. 
MARTI MORTENSEN did not participate or even know about the actions 
of VERNON MORTENSEN, did not authorize or ratify his actions, and has since 
divorced VERNON (although the divorce is not complete as to property 
distribution). 
However, the various policies embodied in the case law strongly argue that 
a Community should not be responsible for a spouse's conduct that supports 
punitive damages. 
• Idaho cases making the Community liable for intentional torts are based 
upon agency principles, that the wrongdoer spouse was acting to benefit or 
protect the community. 
• The punitive damages cases require the wrongdoer to go beyond mere 
intent, and to have acted with specific malice. 
• Idaho recognizes that malice does not impute to the principal, even though 
intent may be imputed, unless the principal participates, authorizes or 
ratifies the malicious conduct. 
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• The purpose of punitive damages, deterrence, is not served by charging an 
innocent spouse with her husband's wrongdoing. 
• Finally in this case, the marital community has, since the time of the 
incident, been terminated. 
Based on this analysis, the court should conclude that a marital community 
- or more precisely, the other spouse's half of the marital community - is not 
liable for punitive damages asserted against one spouse, and no judgment should 
enter against the innocent spouse individually or jointly. 
B. MARTI MORTENSEN should be permitted to raise this issue on 
remand 
AKERS argued that the issues raised by MARTI MORTENSEN as to the 
applicability of punitive damages to her as a divorced spouse, were outside the 
scope of the remand. 
1. Scope of Remand 
This Court may determine whether punitive damages should apply jointly 
and severally to MARTI MORTENSEN. In Mountainview Landowners Co-op. 
Ass'n, Inc. v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861, 136 P.3d 332 (2006) the Court held that: 
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"Issues not raised below but raised for the first time on appeal will not be 
considered or reviewed." .... However, "[t]he general rule is that, on 
remand, a trial court has authority to take actions it is specifically directed to 
take, or those which are subsidiary to the actions directed by the 
appellate court." 
State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 886, 11 P.3d 1101,1104 (2000) involved a remand 
in a criminal case due to a suppression issue; the District Court permitted Hosey to 
withdraw his guilty plea on remand. The Court stated, 
There is no question that had we reversed the denial of the motion to 
suppress, yet remained silent about the withdrawal of the plea, the trial court 
would have had jurisdiction to allow Hosey to withdraw the guilty plea, if 
such an action complied with the terms of the plea agreement, because the 
withdrawal of the plea would clearly be a subsidiary action to the Court's 
reversal of the denial of the motion to suppress. This case is no different. 
Hosey's motion to withdraw his plea was within the trial court's jurisdiction 
on remand because ruling on the effect of an appellate court's decision 
under the terms of a plea agreement is necessarily subsidiary to any other 
directive on remand where a defendant has entered a conditional guilty plea. 
Akers v. Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39, 205 P.3d 1175, 1183 (2009) specifically 
included the issue of joint and several liability in its remand: 
The district court awarded Sherrie Akers $10,000 for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, for which Appellants are jointly and severally liable. 
To support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a party 
must prove a breach of a recognized legal duty. Nation v. State, Dept. of 
Carr., 144 Idaho 177, 191, 158 P.3d 953,967 (2007). In the instant case, the 
district court predicated the award of damages for negligent infliction of 
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emotional distress on Appellants' malicious behavior while trespassing on 
the Akers' property. As we indicated in Akers I, the question of damages 
flowing from Appellants' conduct is inseparable from consideration of 
Appellants' easement rights. Akers I, 142 Idaho at 304, 127 P.3d at 207. 
Without a determination of Appellants' easement rights, it is impossible to 
determine the scope of Appellants' trespass. Therefore, we vacate the 
district court's award of damages for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress and remand the issue for further determination after the 
district court determines Appellants' easement rights. For the same 
reason, we vacate the district court's award of punitive damages in 
favor of the Akers. [Emphasis added] 
MARTI MORTENSEN'S assertion of the issue of Community liability for 
punitive damages due to her husband's actions, is logically subsidiary to the 
determination of whether punitive damages apply at all. More simply, the entire 
issue of damages was put back on the table by the Supreme Court; this Court may 
consider whatever aspects thereof it chooses. 
2. New Events 
The original damages award was back in 2004; the MORTENSENS' 
divorce, which gave rise to this issue, did not occur until 2006. Hence the issue of 
whether punitive damages should apply to a divorced spouse was not ripe at the 
time of the original trial since the facts giving rise had not occurred yet. E.g., Bell 
Rapids Mut. Irrigation Co. v. Hausner, 126 Idaho 752, 754, 890 P.2d 338, 340 
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(1995). 
MARTI MORTENSEN submits that the issue of punitive damages applying 
to her could not have been raised at the first trial, but is within the scope of the 
current remand. 
5. Recusal 
MARTI MORTENSEN respectfully echoes the argument of other 
Appellants that Judge Mitchell should have recused himself. 
Conclusion 
MARTI MORTENSEN asks that this Court reverse the decision of the 
District Courted and remand with instructions that MARTI MORTENSEN not be 
assessed punitive damages, that Attorneys fees be apportioned, that Judge Mitchell 
be directed to recuse, and that all other relief requested by Appellants wrnTE and 
VERNON MORTENSEN be granted. 
May 31, 2012 
Attorney for MARTI MORTENSEN 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Dustin Deissner certifies: 
I have on this date served the foregoing document upon the following 
parties by the following means: 
TO: BY: 
VERNON J. MORTENSEN [X] US Mail 1 st Class Postage Prepaid 
POBOX 1922 [ ] Delivery Service 
BONNERS FERRY ID 83805 [ ] Facsimile to: 
Robert Covington, [] US Mail 1 st Class Postage Prepaid 
8884 N Government Way, Ste A [ ] Delivery Service 
Hayden, ID 83835 [X] Facsimile to: 208-762-4546 
Leander James [X] US Mail 1 st Class Postage Prepaid 
Susan Weeks [ ] Delivery Service 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P. A. [ ] Facsimile to: (208) 664-1684 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Dated May 31, 2012 
Dustin Deissner 
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APPENDIX A 
Akers v. Mortensen Decision 
Attached 
-20-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 33587/33694 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. 
AKERS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
v. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E. ) 
MORTENSEN, husband and wife, ) 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. 
WHITE, husband and wife, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. ) 
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HORTON, Justice 
This appeal arises from a bench trial concerning an easement and trespass dispute. 
Vernon and Marti Mortensen, David and Michelle White, and D.L. White Construction, Inc. 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Appellants") appeal the district court's judgment 
regarding the existence, scope, and location of Appellants' easement across Respondents Dennis 
and Sherrie Akers' property and the district court's award of compensatory and punitive 
damages for trespass and emotional distress. This Court previously decided an appeal 
concerning this case in Akers v. D.L. White Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 127 P.3d 196 (2005) 
(Akers I). We vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The facts of this case are set out in detail in Akers I. There are four parcels of property 
involved in this case: "Government Lot 2," "Parcel A," "Parcel B" and the "Reynolds Property." 
The four parcels are rectangular and meet together at a four-way comer. Government Lot 2 is 
located to the northeast, and Parcel B is to the northwest. The Akers own the southwestern 
comer of Government Lot 2 and the southeastern comer of Parcel B. Parcel A is located to the 
southwest and much of Parcel A, including that adjoining Parcel B, is owned by the Whites. The 
Mortensens own a portion of Parcel A located to the south of that owned by the Whites. The 
Reynolds Property is located to the southeast and is not owned by any of the parties to this 
litigation. Together, the Whites and Mortensens plan to subdivide and develop their respective 
properties. 
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Government Lot 2 is bisected roughly north to south by a county road, Millsap Loop 
Road. Appellants hold an easement for ingress and egress to Millsap Loop Road across portions 
of the Akers' property. Because the properties meet at a four-way comer, Parcel A and 
Government Lot 2 do not actually share a border. It is therefore physically impossible to access 
Parcel A from Millsap Loop Road in Government Lot 2 without also passing through some other 
property. 
The Akers acquired their real property in 1980. At the time of acquisition, a road 
provided access to Parcel A, running through the southern portion of Government Lot 2 and the 
southeastern comer of Parcel B. The access road was connected to Millsap Loop Road by an 
approach (the original approach) that turned sharply north from the access road, which runs east 
to west. The original approach was located on a blind curve in Millsap Loop Road. In order to 
obtain a building permit, the Akers were required to alter the entrance point of the access road 
where it connects to Millsap Loop Road, so that the entrance had a 30-foot line of sight in each 
direction of Millsap Loop Road. The Akers constructed a new approach (the curved approach), 
which starts to tum earlier and curves more gently to the north before meeting Millsap Loop 
Road. The Akers eventually quarreled with the Whites' predecessors in interest, the Peplinskis, 
over the Peplinskis' use of the access road, leading to the Peplinskis filing a lawsuit. The 
Peplinski/Akers suit ended in 1994 when the Peplinskis sold their property, including Parcel A, 
to the Mortensens. The Mortensens later sold much of Parcel A, including that portion adjoining 
Parcel B, to the Whites. 
In January 2002, the Akers blocked Appellants' use of the curved approach to the access 
road and forbade Appellants from traveling on the western end of the access road where it passes 
through Parcel B before connecting to Appellants' property in Parcel A. Appellants then brought 
in heavy equipment, including a bulldozer, to carve a route around the Akers' gate and to 
otherwise alter the access road. This led to a series of confrontations between the Akers and 
Appellants, as well as alleged damage to the Akers' property and alleged malicious behavior by 
Appellants. 
In response, the Akers filed the instant action for trespass, quiet title, and negligence. 
During the trial, the district court personally viewed the access road and property in question. 
The district court confirmed to Appellants an express easement 12.2 feet in width across the 
Akers' property in Government Lot 2, through the original approach, but not the curved 
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approach, to Millsap Loop Road. Although the district court confirmed Appellants' easement 
across part of the Akers' land, the court found that the easement ended at the western boundary 
of Government Lot 2 and did not cross into the Akers' property in Parcel B. 
The district court also awarded the Akers compensatory damages ansmg from 
Appellants' trespass in the amount of$17,002.85, which was trebled pursuant to I.C. § 6-202 for 
a total of $51,008.55, to be paid by Appellants jointly and severally. Sherrie Akers was awarded 
$10,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress, also to be paid jointly and severally by 
Appellants. Additionally, the district court entered punitive damage awards in favor of the Akers 
against the Mortensens in the amount of $150,000 and against the Whites in the amount of 
$30,000. Finally, the district court granted an award of costs and attorney fees to the Akers, to 
be paid jointly and severally by the Mortensens and Whites, in the amount of $105,534.06. 
Appellants appealed from that judgment and the dispute came before this Court in Akers 
I. This Court remanded the case to the district court for additional fact finding and a 
determination regarding whether Appellants were entitled to a prescriptive easement or an 
easement implied from prior use. Additionally, we vacated the award of damages, costs, and 
attorney fees for further consideration in light of the district court's conclusions on remand 
regarding the scope of Appellants' easement rights. 
On remand, the district court concluded that Appellants were not entitled to an implied 
easement from prior use because the access road was not reasonably necessary for the enjoyment 
of the dominant estate, Parcel A. The district court based this conclusion of law on its finding 
that, at the time of the severance of the dominant estate from the servient estate, there was a 
second road that provided access to Parcel A. The district court concluded that Appellants were 
entitled to a prescriptive easement across Government Lot 2, 12.2 feet in width, which was 
coextensive with the scope and location of the express easement. The district court also found 
the prescriptive easement passed from Government Lot 2 into Parcel B and immediately turned 
ninety degrees to the south to provide access to Parcel A. Based on these findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, the district court reinstated the award of damages, costs, and attorney fees 
from Akers I, and awarded the Akers their costs and attorney fees on remand. Appellants timely 
appealed from the district court's order on remand. 
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Review of a trial court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports 
the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Benninger 
v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 488, 129 P.3d 1235, 1237 (2006) (citing Alumet v. Bear Lake 
Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946, 949, 812 P.2d 253,256 (1991». Since it is the province of the trial 
court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses, 
this Court will liberally construe the trial court's findings of fact in favor of the judgment 
entered. Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 107, 982 P.2d 940, 942 (1999) (citing Sun Valley 
Shamrock Res., Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 118, 794 P.2d 1389, 1391 
(1990». A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous. Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006) 
(citing Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 856, 55 P.3d 304, 310 (2002); 
Bramwell v. South Rigby Canal Co., 136 Idaho 648, 650, 39 P.3d 588, 590 (2001); LR.C.P 
52(a». If the findings of fact are based upon substantial evidence, even if the evidence is 
conflicting, they will not be overturned on appeal. Benninger, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d at 
1238 (citing Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148, 151, 953 P.2d 588, 591 (1998». This Court will 
not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court. Ransom, 143 Idaho at 643, 152 P.3d 
at 4 (citing Bramwell, 136 Idaho at 648, 39 P.3d at 588). The findings of the trial court on the 
question of damages will not be set aside when based upon substantial and competent evidence. 
Trilogy Network Sys., Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 846, 172 P.3d 1119, 1121 (2007) (citing 
Idaho Falls Bonded Produce Supply Co. v. General Mills Rest. Group, Inc., 105 Idaho 46, 49, 
665 P.2d 1056, 1059 (1983». 
III. ANALYSIS 
Both sides to this appeal ask this Court to finally resolve their dispute. We are unable to 
fulfill their requests. We conclude that the district court's factual findings were based, in part, 
upon impermissible reliance on a viewing of the property. Normally, we would remand the case 
to the district court for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with this 
opinion. However, the parties have displayed a high degree of animosity towards each other and 
the district judge. We conclude that it is in the best interest of all parties involved, including the 
district judge, to vacate the judgment and remand the case for a new trial before a different 
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district judge. Although this remedy is rarely exercised by this Court, we find it best serves the 
interest of justice. 
A. The district court erred when making factual findings relating to the scope and 
location of Appellants' prescriptive easement. 
The district court relied upon its personal on-site view of the subject property to find 
certain facts relating to the scope of Appellants' prescriptive easement. This was error. 
Additionally, the district court's finding regarding the location of the easement on Parcel B was 
not supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
The district court's finding that Appellants' prescriptive easement was 12.2 feet wide was 
based substantially on its view of the property. The district court specifically found that: 
"[Appellants'] argument that the easement should be 25 feet wide is simply unsupported by the 
record and a view of the premises." Appellants argued that the easement should be 25 feet wide, 
including ditches and shoulders. The district court, however, found that: "The view and the 
exhibits show that not all of the length of the roadway has ditches on either or both sides, nor did 
the view show any consistent 'shoulders.'" We conclude that the district court's reliance on its 
site view was error. It is well established in Idaho that the knowledge obtained by a jury view of 
a premises can only be used to determine the weight and applicability of the evidence introduced 
at trial and that a view of the premises "is not of itself evidence upon which a verdict may be 
based." Tyson Creek R.R. Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 31 Idaho 580, 590,174 P. 1004, 1007 (1918). 
When construing a prior Idaho statute that permitted a jury to view the premises in question, this 
Court held: "'The purpose of the statute is not to permit the taking of evidence out of court, but 
simply to permit the jury to view the place where the transaction is shown to have occurred, in 
order that they may the better understand the evidence which has been introduced. ", State v. 
McClurg, 50 Idaho 762, 796, 300 P. 898,911 (1931) (quoting State v. Main, 37 Idaho 449, 459, 
216 P. 731, 734 (1923)). Although these cases involve a viewing of the property by a jury, for 
purposes of appellate review, there is no analytical difference between a jury view and a court 
view. The policy underlying this rule of law is clear: the record must reflect the evidence upon 
which the finder of fact made its decision. This Court is simply unable to evaluate the basis of 
factual determinations made upon the basis of a view. 
These rules remained intact when this Court adopted the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
in 1958. Under LR.C.P. 43(f), during a trial, the court may order that the court or jury may view 
the property that is subject to the action. This Court addressed the substantive weight afforded to 
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a court view in Lobdell v. State ex reI. Bd. of Highway Dir., a case involving an inverse 
condemnation. 89 Idaho 559,407 P.2d 135 (1965). In Lobdell, after the judge had viewed the 
property in question, the district court granted an offset to the plaintiff for restoration of access to 
their property that had been limited by curbing constructed by the defendant. Id. at 563, 407 
P.2d at 137. This Court held the district court erred when it entered findings based on the results 
of an examination of the premises and noted that an inspection of the premises is only useful to 
evaluate and apply the evidence submitted at trial. Id. at 567-68, 407 P.2d at 139-40. 
Idaho is not alone in adhering to this rule: Bd. of Educ. of Claymont Special Sch. Dist v. 
13 Acres of Land in Brandywine Hundred, 131 A.2d 180 (Del. 1957); Dade County v. Renedo, 
147 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1962); Derrick v. Rabun County, 129 S.E.2d 583 (Ga. 1963); State v. 
Simerlein, 325 N.E.2d 503 (Ind. App. 1975); Guinn v.Iowa & St. L. R. Co., 109 N.W. 209 (Iowa 
1906); State v. Lee, 63 P.2d 135 (Mont. 1936); State by State Highway Comm'r v. Gorga, 149 
A.2d 266 (N.J. 1959); Myra Found. v. Us., 267 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1959) (applying North 
Dakota law); In re Appropriation of Worth, 183 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio 1962); Port of Newport v. 
Haydon, 478 P.2d 445 (Or. App. 1970); Durika v. Sch. Dist. of Derry Township, 203 A.2d 474 
(Pa. 1964); Ajootian v. Dir. of Pub. Works, 155 A.2d 244 (R.I. 1959) (stating rule in dicta only); 
Townsend v. State, 43 N.W.2d 458 (Wis. 1950). 
As previously noted, the district court found that the prescriptive easement turned ninety 
degrees to the south from the access road immediately upon entering Parcel B. This finding was 
not supported by substantial and competent evidence. The district court found that historically, 
the prescriptive easement "turned south on to defendants' land" and "'disappeared'" after 
crossing into Parcel B. We have carefully examined the exhibits upon which both Appellants 
and Respondents rely, as well as those addressed by the district court in its Order on Remand. 
There was testimony in the record, offered by Richard Peplinski, that the prescriptive easement 
traveled in a western direction across Parcel B for at least 125 feet before it curved onto his 
property to provide access to a Quonset hut. Although the Akers claim that the evidence on this 
subject is conflicting, we are not so persuaded. The aerial photograph upon which the Akers rely 
clearly shows a roadway resembling a shepherd's crook, extending well east into Parcel B before 
curving back to the southwest toward the Quonset hut. The exhibits offered by the Respondents 
are similar. All exhibits are consistent with Peplinski's testimony and reveal that the access road 
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traveled east into Parcel B before curving back towards the Quonset hut on Parcel A. For these 
reasons, we find this finding to be clearly erroneous. 
The district court erred when it relied on its site view to find the scope of the easement 
and the district court's finding regarding the location of the easement on Parcel B is not based 
upon substantial and competent evidence. Therefore, the judgment establishing the location and 
scope of Appellants' easement must be vacated. 
B. The district court's award of compensatory and punitive damages must be vacated. 
The district court also erred when it reinstated the damage award from Akers 1. That 
damage award was based, in part, upon the district court's view of the premises. The district 
court awarded the Akers trespass damages resulting from Appellants' efforts to improve the road 
on Parcel B. These improvements consisted of excavation and the dumping of fill to provide a 
road base. The district court found that these activities occurred to the west of where it located 
Appellants' prescriptive easement on Parcel B. We have determined that the district court's 
factual finding as to the location of the easement on Parcel B is clearly erroneous. The district 
court specifically found that it had "viewed the area, and fI ound] such excavation to have 
occurred further to the west of where the road immediately went into what would be the exact 
northeast comer of what is now [Parcel A]." The damage award also compensated the Akers for 
Appellants' trespass outside the scope of Appellants 12.2-foot prescriptive easement across 
Government Lot 2. As indicated above, the district court's finding that the scope of Appellants' 
prescriptive easement was 12.2 feet in width was based upon the district court's view of the 
premises. Accordingly, the entirety of the trespass damages award must be vacated. 
The district court's determination of damages for emotional distress and its award of 
punitive damages related to conduct by Appellants in the course of that which the district court 
determined to be trespass. As the scope of trespass, if any, will be determined in a new trial, we 
vacate the entire award of compensatory and punitive damages. For the same reason, the district 
court's award of attorney fees and costs to the Akers is vacated. 
C. This matter will be reassigned to a new district judge to conduct a new trial. 
Normally, we would remand the case to the district court for additional findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. However, given the animosity woven into this case, we find it 
appropriate to remand the case for assignment to a new district judge. In fairness to the district 
judge, and the parties as well, we think it a difficult and uncomfortable task for the district judge 
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to now revisit and re-evaluate the evidence, disregarding his own earlier observations and factual 
determinations, particularly in light of allegations by Appellants that he cannot act impartially. 
Although such allegations rarely warrant reassignment, appellate courts in other jurisdictions 
have found it best to assign cases to a new trial judge in certain limited circumstances. See Beck 
v. Beck, 766 A.2d 482, 485 (Del. 2001); In re Guardianship of Lienemann, Not Reported in 
N. W.2d, 2004 WL 420158 (Neb. App. 2004); In re Guardianship of R. G. and F., 382 A.2d 654, 
658 (N.J. 1977); In re Custody of A.L.A.P.-G., Not Reported in P.3d, 2003 WL 22234910 (Wash. 
App.2003). This case is one of the rare instances in which reassignment is appropriate. 
D. Neither party will receive an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
The Akers and the Mortensens have each requested an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
As the Akers have not prevailed in this appeal, they are not entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
We cannot conclude that the Akers have frivolously defended this appeal. Accordingly, we deny 
the Mortensens' request for an award of attorney fees. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The judgment is vacated and this case is remanded for a new trial before a different 
judge. Costs to Appellants. 
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices BURDICK, J. JONES and Justice Pro Tern 
TROUT, CONCUR. 
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